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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Scott Clifford McAuley appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with a persistent
violator enhancement. McAuley claims the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Deputy Garrett Kinnan was dispatched to a report of an unresponsive
individual inside a car parked at a Chevron. (Tr., p.9, Ls.11-19.) When Deputy
Kinnan arrived on scene, he located a parked, but running, car and observed a
man inside the vehicle “who appeared to be asleep or was having what seemed
like a medical issue[.]” (Tr., p.10, Ls.3-8, p.15, Ls.12-25.) The individual, later
identified as McAuley, did not respond to the deputy’s loud knocking on his
window, and Deputy Kinnan noticed McAuley was “tossing his head back and
forth, his eyes were shut, [and] his lips were moving.” (Tr., p.10, L.6 – p.11,
L.16.) Deputy Kinnan requested “medical back up” who responded to the scene
to assess McAuley. (Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.9.) McAuley was unable to explain
to medical personnel “where he was at,” “where he was coming from or how long
he had been there.”

(Tr., p.12, Ls.13-15.)

process, almost in a confused state.”

He was also “[s]low in thought

(Tr., p.12, Ls.15-16.)

The medical

personnel left after McAuley signed a “medical release,” but Deputy Kinnan
remained concerned because he felt McAuley was “impaired.” (Tr., p.14, L.7 –
p.15, L.11; see also p.17, Ls.19-21.) By that point, Deputy Kinnan was also
1

aware that McAuley’s driving privileges were suspended and that he was in
Idaho without permission from his probation officer.

(Tr., p.16, Ls.1-6, p.17,

Ls.17-19.)
Deputy Kinnan arrested McAuley, after which he searched McAuley’s
vehicle. (Tr., p.17, L.22 – p.18, L.5.) The search revealed “several syringes,”
one containing methamphetamine, “several knives and a firearm.” (Tr., p.18,
Ls.6-8.) McAuley was on parole at the time and was not allowed to possess a
firearm. (Tr., p.18, Ls.9-16.)
The state charged McAuley with possession of a controlled substance,
unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R.,
pp.25-26.) The state also alleged McAuley is a persistent violator. (R., p.27.)
McAuley filed a motion to suppress claiming he was unlawfully detained,
searched, interrogated, and arrested. (R., p.35.) The court denied McAuley’s
motion after an evidentiary hearing.

(See generally Tr., pp.7-49.)

McAuley

subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance and the enhancement, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
suppression motion, and the state dismissed the firearm and paraphernalia
charges.

(R., pp.68-79, 87; see generally Tr., pp.57-75.)

The district court

imposed a unified 10-year sentence, with three years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.87-90.) McAuley filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment. (R., pp.92-94.)
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ISSUE
McAuley states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McAuley’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has McAuley failed to show any error in the district court’s determination
that McAuley was not entitled to suppression since his initial contact with law
enforcement was based upon the community caretaking function and, during that
contact, the deputy developed probable cause to arrest McAuley for driving
without privileges and reasonable suspicion to detain him for driving under the
influence?
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ARGUMENT
McAuley Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
McAuley concedes “Deputy Kinnan initially encountered [him] pursuant to

his community caretaking function to perform a medical check” and concedes
that “[d]uring the course of the medical check, Deputy Kinnan learned that Mr.
McAuley was driving without privileges.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) Nevertheless,
McAuley argues that he was entitled to suppression because, he claims, “Deputy
Kinnan did not have reasonable suspicion for a drug investigation and his
continued questioning . . . about drugs prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention and
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.”1 (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) This
argument is without merit. Because Deputy Kinnan had probable cause to arrest
McAuley for driving without privileges, he did not need reasonable suspicion of a
different offense in order to continue to detain McAuley.

Moreover,

notwithstanding McAuley’s assertions to the contrary, the district court correctly
concluded that Deputy Kinnan had reasonable suspicion to believe McAuley had
been driving under the influence of narcotics and could lawfully detain him to
confirm or dispel that suspicion. McAuley has failed to show any error in the
denial of his suppression motion.

1

McAuley’s suppression motion also asserted a Fifth Amendment violation
based on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (R., pp.39-40.) On appeal,
McAuley does not challenge the district court’s denial of this aspect of his motion.
(See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-13.)
4

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).
C.

McAuley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His
Suppression Motion
“The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and

seizures applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling
short of arrest.” State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct.
App. 2002) (citations omitted). “An arrest for a public offense, whether a felony
or misdemeanor, may be made upon probable cause.” State v. Carr, 123 Idaho
127, 130, 844 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).

“Driving

without privileges is a public offense and can be charged as either a felony or
misdemeanor.” Id. Thus, driving without privileges is a crime for which arrest is
appropriate so long as the arrest is based upon probable cause. Id.
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McAuley concedes, as he must, that Deputy Kinnan had probable cause
to arrest him for driving without privileges, and Deputy Kinnan developed
probable cause for such an arrest during the medical assessment that was
initiated pursuant to Deputy Kinnan’s lawful community caretaking function.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.7, 8.) This concession is consistent with the evidence, the
district court’s factual findings, and the district court’s conclusion that Deputy
Kinnan had “probable cause at that point for any subsequent seizure that
occurred.”

(Tr., p.40, L.1 – p.41, L.4.)

Nevertheless, McAuley argues that

because “Deputy Kinnan could have written [him] a ticket for driving without
privileges or further investigated that offense,” but “did not do so,” any further
detention required reasonable suspicion of a different offense, which McAuley
contends did not exist. (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) This argument is contrary to law.
That Deputy Kinnan “could have” written a ticket but did not does not
mean the probable cause for McAuley’s detention disappeared. Nor did Deputy
Kinnan’s failure to conduct “further investigat[ion] of that offense” dissipate the
probable cause, and it is unclear what additional investigation McAuley thinks
was necessary, much less required.

McAuley cites no authority for the

proposition that an officer must cite or arrest someone for the same offense that
provided probable cause for the detention in the first instance in order for the
detention to be lawful.

Instead, McAuley relies on cases that stand for the

proposition that “[a] police officer can abandon an investigation to pursue a new
line of inquiry if he has reasonable suspicion supporting the new line of inquiry.”
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9 (citations omitted).) McAuley apparently extrapolates
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from this principle that reasonable suspicion for a “new line of inquiry” is a
necessary prerequisite to continuing to detain an individual, despite the existence
of probable cause, if the individual is not ultimately charged with the offense on
which the detention was initially based. This argument is not only unsupported
by the legal principle upon which McAuley relies, it would essentially require
officers to arrest for, or the state to charge defendants with, additional crimes.
Presumably, this is not actually the result McAuley, or any other criminal
defendant, would advocate.
A review of State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 329 P.3d 391 (Ct. App.
2014), one of the cases McAuley cites in support of his claim (Appellant’s Brief,
p.9), further illustrates why McAuley’s reliance on the legal principle from that
case does not apply. In Perez-Jungo, an officer saw a vehicle parked on the side
of a gravel road in the early morning hours and approached the vehicle due to
“concern that the vehicle was abandoned, the vehicle was stolen, the driver was
in need of assistance, or the driver may have been involved in recent vandalisms
of cell towers in the area.” Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 612, 329 P.3d at 394.
Upon making contact with the driver, Perez-Jungo, the officer “asked what he
was doing,” and Perez-Jungo said “he was waiting for a friend and that someone
had told him there was a potential job site nearby.” Id. “The officer noted that
Perez-Jungo’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy,” but Perez-Jungo denied he had
been drinking. Id. The officer also noticed a statue on Perez-Jungo’s dashboard
that he recognized as the “patron saint of drug traffickers.” Id. (footnote omitted).
After confirming Perez-Jungo had a valid license and no warrants, the officer told
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Perez-Jungo to exit his vehicle and, while shining a light into the vehicle, the
officer “saw what appeared to be drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance,
leading to a search of the vehicle” and Perez-Jungo’s eventual arrest. Id. at 612613, 329 P.3d at 394-395.
Perez-Jungo filed a motion to suppress, arguing, in relevant part, that his
detention was unlawfully extended without reasonable suspicion. Perez-Jungo,
156 Idaho at 613, 329 P.3d at 395. Addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals
explained the relevant legal standards:
The purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated.
Any routine investigative detention might turn up suspicious
circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions
unrelated to the initial purpose for the stop. Such unrelated
inquiries, if brief, do not necessarily exceed the scope of the initial
detention and violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Moreover, an officer’s observations and general inquiries, and the
events succeeding the stop, may—and often do—give rise to
legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further
investigation by an officer. Indeed, a detention initiated for one
investigative purpose may disclose suspicious circumstances that
justify expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. Thus,
the length and scope of the initial investigatory detention may be
lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific articulable
facts that justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is,
has been, or is about to engage in criminal activity.
Accordingly, our inquiry is directed at determining
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, upon resolution
of the initial justifications for the stop, to continue the
detention to investigate other possible crimes.
Id. at 614-615, 329 P.3d at 396-397 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Thus, reasonable suspicion of a different crime is only necessary for
continuing a detention “upon resolution of the initial justifications for the stop.” Id.
at 615, 329 P.3d at 397. The initial justification for McAuley’s detention never
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ended because Deputy Kinnan could have arrested McAuley at any time based
upon probable cause that McAuley was driving without privileges. That Deputy
Kinnan did not do so does not mean the justification ended. McAuley’s reliance
on other cases applying the principle articulated in Perez-Jungo to facts where
the officer could only issue a citation, and could not detain a driver beyond what
was required to accomplish that task, also do not apply since McAuley was
subject to arrest, not just a citation. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9, 13.)
Because Deputy Kinnan did not need any basis for detaining McAuley in
addition to the probable cause he had to detain and arrest McAuley for driving
without privileges, the Court need not address McAuley’s argument that the
district court erred in finding Deputy Kinnan also had reasonable suspicion to
believe that McAuley was driving under the influence.

Even if considered,

McAuley’s claim fails.
“Under Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)], an investigative detention is
permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion
that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App.
2003). “The justification for an investigate detention is evaluated upon the totality
of the circumstances then known to the officer.” Id. (citations omitted).
With respect to reasonable suspicion that McAuley had been driving under
the influence, the district court found:
. . . Mr. McAuley was, at the time, seated in the driver’s seat,
the engine was running, the parking lot is a public place, or it is a
private property open to the public by the appearance of the video
and from the officer’s testimony that this was a gas station.
9

Mr. McAuley, upon being approached by the officer, was
slumped over. His initial questions to the officer and the paramedic
appear to be confused -- or his initial answers to their questions.
The paramedic asks Mr. McAuley, while the officer is standing
there, where are you at? Mr. Cauley’s -- Mr. McAuely’s response is
Burns, Oregon. Where did you start out today? Mr. McAuley
replies, I don’t know, and I don’t remember falling asleep. Mr.
McAuley denies taking any medications.
He also tells the
paramedic something else about falling asleep.
Based on my observations of Mr. McAuley on the video, as
well as the officer’s testimony about his observations of Mr.
McAuley, I find that there is a reasonable suspicion in the officer’s
mind that at the time the paramedics were talking to Mr. McAuley,
Mr. McAuley play -- may have been operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of some substance that would justify the
officer’s detention of Mr. McAuley.
(Tr., p.41, L.15 – p.42, L.13.)
Deputy Kinnan’s observations, referenced by the district court, included
Deputy Kinnan seeing McAuley “tossing his head back and forth, his eyes were
shut, [and] his lips were moving” (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-15), McAuley’s inability to
explain to medical personnel “where he was at,” “where he was coming from or
how long he had been there” (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-15), and McAuley’s “[s]low”
“thought process,” and “confused state” (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-16).
McAuley does not challenge any of the factual findings underpinning the
district court’s finding of reasonable suspicion or even the district court’s
conclusion that the facts supported a finding of reasonable suspicion that
McAuley was driving under the influence, but contends “Deputy Kinnan did not
have reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. McAuley had committed, or was
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about to commit, a drug crime.”2 (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) It is unclear how this
complaint is relevant since Deputy Kinnan did not need reasonable suspicion of a
“drug crime” in order to detain him, and the district court’s determination was not
based on reasonable suspicion of a “drug crime.”
McAuley similarly complains that Deputy Kinnan “questioned [him] about
drugs because of [his] nervous behavior, the way he was answering questions,
and the fact that he could not recall the exact date he was released from prison,”
none of which McAuley believes was adequate to “establish reasonable
suspicion of drug activity.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.) In addition to ignoring the
actual finding of reasonable suspicion, which was based on driving under the
influence, McAuley ignores half of the factors noted by the district court and
testified to by Deputy Kinnan. The totality of circumstances as set forth by the
district court, as outlined by Deputy Kinnan, and as reflected in the video of
Deputy Kinnan’s interaction with McAuley, support the district court’s finding that
there was reasonable suspicion to believe McAuley was driving under the
influence. Although that finding was unnecessary in light of the existence of
probable cause to arrest McAuley, the finding is supported by the evidence and
the law. McAuley has failed to show otherwise.

2

McAuley does not argue, as he did with respect to Deputy Kinnan’s probable
cause to arrest for driving without privileges, that any reasonable suspicion for
driving under the influence disappeared once Deputy Kinnan decided not to
charge him with that offense, but instead charged him with possession of a
controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, unlawful possession of a
firearm, and carrying a concealed weapon without a license. (R., p.11.)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon McAuley’s conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance
with a persistent violator enhancement.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2016.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of July, 2016, served a true
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electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.
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_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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